Sudan’s civil war continues to rage, with no sign that either the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) or Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are close to a military victory or open to a ceasefire.
Over 10 million civilians are displaced within Sudan or into neighbouring countries. Its economy is in ruins, with business centres transformed into battlefields. Severe hunger afflicts half the population, with famine emerging in Darfur.
Less discussed, however, is the impact of the conflict on regional illicit markets. The war has had a catalytic effect on these, as civilians and combatants turn to smuggling networks for key goods. Illicit businesses have boomed, especially in the historically marginalised borderlands between Chad, Libya and Sudan.
Although many types of smuggled goods feed the conflict economy, food, fuel and arms stand out as especially important in and around Sudan’s northern and western borders.
Food smuggling into Sudan predates the war, but the conflict has supercharged it. In recent research conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, interviewees flagged a marked increase in the clandestine movement of food (such as rice, pasta, flour, sugar and cooking oil) over the last eight months, as hunger in Sudan has worsened.
Interviewees report that food smuggling in Sudan’s borderlands is highly decentralised, with many relatively small smugglers plying the routes between southern Libya, northern Chad, and northwestern Sudan.
Like food, fuel smuggling on Sudan’s borders is not new. A high-volume trade in contraband petrol and diesel from eastern Libya to Sudan emerged the year before the war, reportedly controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and RSF. The conflict’s disruption of licit fuel supplies in Sudan has expanded the trade’s value and volume.
The main route remains through eastern Libya. On it, a few LAAF-linked actors smuggle fuel from coastal depots to the southern city of Kufra and across into SAF-controlled areas in Sudan. One research contact estimated that 500 000 barrels of petrol and diesel were smuggled weekly via this route.
Over the past year, another smuggling route has emerged between LAAF-controlled southwestern Libya, northern Chad, and Sudan’s western Darfur region. While initially ad hoc, driven by low-level smugglers, it has reportedly become more tightly organised and controlled by LAAF and RSF officials.
Weapons trafficking is perhaps the most militarily critical of the cross-border illicit markets boosted by the war. Most international reporting focuses on weapons trafficking to Sudan by nations supporting either the RSF or SAF. While this fuels the conflict, it is just one part of the picture.
A more decentralised arms trade has emerged, primarily concentrated around the Chad-Sudan border. This trade primarily draws on weapons and ammunition already in Libya or other regional conflict zones. However, in the tri-border region a recent seizure of four trailers of weapons imported through the Libyan port of Benghazi destined for Chad highlights the risk that international trafficking pathways could be emerging.
The weapons trade across the Chad-Sudan border is bidirectional, with Sudanese traffickers exporting weapons stolen from or abandoned by SAF personnel in Darfur to networks in eastern Chad, which then move them to other regional markets. This points to the evolution of important counter-cyclical markets in goods – mostly weapons, stolen vehicles, plundered consumer goods and hashish – smuggled out of Sudan.
The conflict has also driven an increase in human smuggling along Sudan’s borders. This is dominated by refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, whose avenues for legal and safe movement out of the country have shrunk over the past 20 months. Human smuggling networks have either expanded existent operations or developed new routes along the Egyptian, Libyan and Chadian borders. The conflict is effectively reinvigorating and partially reshaping the human smuggling ecosystem in Sudan and neighbouring states.
Crucially, these illicit markets are not static and will probably continue evolving and expanding as the conflict continues. Experience from other regional conflicts, notably Libya, has also shown that shifts in illicit markets and war economies can have a lasting impact long after the guns have stopped firing.
For international actors working to end the war, together with understanding and monitoring the conflict’s intersection with illicit markets, is critical.
First, combatants increasingly rely on weapons and fuel trafficked in from abroad to continue the conflict, and smuggled food is critical for starving civilians. Understanding how these flows are evolving can warn international actors about emerging risks and help them tailor responses.
Second, the conflict has led to a growing intersection of illicit and state actors. While the war has caused the breakdown of the Sudanese state, interviewees said smuggling often occurred with the knowledge and protection of RSF- and SAF-affiliated actors in Sudan and officials in neighbouring states.
Officials financially vested in the conflict economy could be disinclined to make peace. Even if peace comes, such connections risk subverting the rule of law, eroding public institutions’ capacities and worsening citizens’ trust in the state. Once illicit and state actors are intertwined, connections can be difficult to reverse.
Third, this could impact the long-term evolution of illicit economies in Sudan. Even a relatively speedy end to the conflict would leave the country weaker, with a wrecked economy and overwhelmed law enforcement. Countering illicit economies probably wouldn’t be prioritised.
Lastly, there are regional consequences to consider. Empowered illicit markets and criminal networks connected to Sudan’s conflict could escalate corruption and weaken governmental capabilities in neighbouring countries. The trafficked arms flowing into the country now could well reverse in the future, fuelling regional instability and violence.
Going forward, most international focus on Sudan will likely be geared towards negotiating a ceasefire and building longer-term peace. However, given the above risks, the conflict economy and its tie-ins with regional markets should be given more attention.
At this point, there is particular value in three interlinked policy areas. First, enhanced efforts to track and analyse the evolution of the conflict economy, with an eye on how this could fuel instability or corruption in Sudan or neighbouring states. Ideally, this should be done in a shareable way and for maximum reach.
Second, policy activity to counter crime on the ground is critical, though it focuses on addressing the worst harms of the war economy, such as abusive human smuggling and unchecked weapons trafficking. Such a nuanced approach could also help mitigate the risk that crackdowns on cross-border smuggling of key commodities – such as food and fuel – unintentionally worsen vulnerable populations’ situations.
Targeted financial and travel sanctions on key members of the criminal ecosystems fuelling Sudan’s war economy could help deter political and business elites in the region from becoming more involved in such illicit economic flows.
For best effect multiple policy tools, possibly under a single, forward-looking strategy, could be used in tandem with prosecutorial approaches, law enforcement capacity building, and diplomatic pressure on regional states and non-state actors facilitating illicit flows. With this, development aid to communities harmed by the war and war economy is critical.
Responding to both ensuring a lasting ceasefire and the emergent illicit economies will be essential for sustained stability in Sudan and the region.
Matt Herbert, Head of Research: North Africa and the Sahel, GI-TOC
Image: Eva-Maria Krafczyk/picture alliance via Getty Images
