Bandits killed more people in Nigeria’s North West from 2018 to 2023 than Islamic State West Africa Province and Jama’atu Ahlul Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad combined in the North East within the same period.
Since 2011, this loose collection of gangs has terrorised people with cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, armed robbery and large-scale attacks on communities. These attacks have occurred mainly in Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Jigawa and Zamfara states, as well as parts of Niger, Kogi, Nasarawa and Plateau states in the North Central Region.
Despite responses that have included military operations and local vigilantism, banditry is spreading. The bandits are agile and have increased their capability and resilience by mobilising funds and resources from multiple revenue streams. Their ability to move between different licit and illicit revenue streams highlights the need for responses that go beyond military interventions, to include community resilience and regulatory interventions.
New Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project research sheds light on the problem. It focuses on bandits’ evolution and structure, and the illicit economies they engage in for financing and resourcing. It also explores interactions with communities and other non-state armed groups.
GI-TOC research shows that armed bandits draw income from and shift between five primary sources: cattle rustling; kidnapping for ransom; artisanal gold mining; providing transport for and extorting road users; and taxing farmers through land seizures and forced labour. They engage in three types of activities within these economies: attacks and robberies aimed at disrupting supply chains; imposing levies on market vendors; and controlling supply chains for specific commodities, like artisanal gold or cattle.
From 2011 to 2019, livestock markets were central to financing armed bandits. Groups generated revenue primarily through cattle rustling and subsequent resale, stealing anything from a few to several hundred head of cattle at a time. Bandits also imposed levies on herders, ostensibly for protection from theft, although this protection was limited as other bandits continued to target cattle. Due to the inadequate security provided, herders generally viewed these levies negatively.
As livestock numbers dropped because of rustling and herders’ relocation to safer zones, cattle rustling revenue decreased. From 2019, armed bandits increasingly turned to kidnapping, which became the primary income source for many groups. From 2019 to 2022, when kidnapping was most profitable in the North West, incidents predominantly targeted affluent farmers and business people. Bandits collected millions of naira in ransom payments.
In late 2022 and 2023, however, the pool of potential targets for kidnappers dwindled and kidnapping individuals became less lucrative. Many farmers and business people, repeatedly targeted, had depleted their wealth through ransom payments, fled or been killed for failing to meet ransom demands.
Public outcry against the crime and the need to secure communities to win votes in elections, among other factors, forced the government to clamp down on kidnapping. They increased security along roads known to be hotspots. But because Nigeria’s security forces are thinly spread across various conflict zones, the impact of these operations tends to be short-lived and military deployments are often temporary in remote areas where armed bandits primarily operate.
As kidnapping and cattle rustling revenues declined, bandits increasingly turned to gold mining for financing.
Initially, bandits targeted and robbed miners and intermediaries engaged in purchasing gold at mining sites. The frequency of attacks started drawing media attention in 2016, particularly after an incident in which 36 gold miners died in the Gidan Ardo community of Zamfara. From 2016 to 2018, attacks intensified, particularly in Kaduna and Zamfara.
In response to rising assaults on miners, and recognising the role of the gold mining sector in financing armed banditry, the federal government banned all mining activities in Zamfara in April 2019. This mirrored state responses across West Africa, especially in the Sahel.
Despite the ban, artisanal mining continued. Since November 2022, miners and purchasers in mines in Bukuyum and Maru have had to pay 10% of their monthly earnings to armed bandits. Despite being termed a ‘protection fee’, this levy primarily secures miners’ and dealers’ access to artisanal gold mining sites rather than ensuring their safety. Local miners who spoke with GI-TOC generally perceive the levies and actions imposed by armed bandits negatively but comply out of fear.
However, many prefer the bandits’ extortive approach to the state’s outright ban. GI-TOC research shows that across various geographies, criminalising markets – such as the ban on gold mining activities in Zamfara – can fuel illegal extortive extractive practices.
From 2021, bandit groups in Zamfara and Kaduna started imposing levies on farming communities in exchange for access to their own farmlands. But even farmers complying with these levies are not guaranteed safety from bandit violence. Some compliant farmers are still kidnapped, forcing their relatives to sell entire harvests to meet ransom demands.
To sustainably weaken armed bandit groups, interventions must be informed by a thorough mapping of the structures and internal dynamics of these criminals, and a holistic picture of their resourcing mechanisms and how these shape their interactions with communities.
Targeting only one revenue source at a time is ineffective, as bandits can quickly shift to others. By addressing a variety of both illicit and licit economies that support armed banditry, authorities can disrupt their financial streams more effectively over the long term. This kind of strategy may reduce the profitability of banditry and weaken bandits’ overall capabilities.
While increased military operations have disrupted banditry in the short term in some areas, sustained security and stability in the North West remains elusive. Evidence points to mixed results from military operations that, while necessary in some instances, are not always appropriate, nor do they show long-term positive consequences.
Drawing on the mapping, a comprehensive response strategy could then combine targeted security measures with community resilience and regulatory responses. For example, targeted security measures that include augmenting security presence during planting (April-June) and harvesting (October-November) seasons to limit extortion and levies on farmers, and also intensifying intelligence-gathering strategies. It is worth noting that prohibitions on economies that are key livelihood sources – such as artisanal gold mining – have backfired, even to the point of making the influence of bandits preferable to that of the state. Responses should consider these risks, and reconsider criminalisation approaches.
Community resilience responses include offering alternative livelihoods to individuals and communities vulnerable to recruitment by bandits. Regulatory measures ideally complement the security and resilience measures through policy and practice. Options may include formalising the artisanal gold mining sector, establishing accountability systems for self-defence groups, and implementing enhanced verification mechanisms for livestock sales.
Kingsley L Madueke, Nigeria Research Coordinator and Lawan Danjuma Adamu, Northern Nigeria Field Coordinator, GI-TOC
