In northern Cameroon, clashes between two ethnic communities over cattle theft have recently killed three people and wounded a dozen more. This indicates intensified cattle rustling in the border regions of Chad and Cameroon, where the coexistence of nomadic pastoralism and agriculture is threatened by security and climate problems.
Cattle rearing by traditional pastoralists and crop farmers plays a crucial role in both the local and regional economies of Chad and Cameroon, contributing significantly to livelihoods, food security, trade and cultural identity.
Livestock contributes up to 7% of Chad’s gross domestic product, which importantly represents over 35% of total wealth in rural areas. In Cameroon, cattle breeding provides 110 000 tonnes of meat annually for local consumption. Cameroon’s population also consumes 166 750 000 litres of milk annually, with the supply chain relying on local production.
According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), incidents of cattle rustling continued an upward trend in the border regions since 2019. They rose from 117 in 2023 to 158 in August 2024 (see Chart 1). Furthermore, 230 people have been killed in attacks linked to cattle rustling between 2015 and August 2024. Annual fatalities peaked in 2023 with 60 people killed. This data, collected by ACLED relies on local groups and media reports, however it is likely that many incidents may have gone unrecorded. Furthermore, a 2023 report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs confirmed that 30,000 oxen were stolen in the entire Lake Chad region between 2014 and 2021.
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Chart 1: Intensified cattle rustling in southern Chad and northern Cameroon
 Source: Authors’ compilation from ACLED |
Recent ENACT research found that the primary enablers and drivers of cattle rustling in the region are a combination of mutually reinforcing factors including transhumance, drought and climate change, child labour and border porosity. Rural communities in the border areas of Cameroon and Chad have emerged as hotbeds of intensifying farmer-herder conflict.
Transhumance is described as ‘a system in which herders move cyclically along traditional corridors, both within the country’s boundaries and across borders, in search of fodder and water for their livestock.’ These movements have become a source of clashes between herders and agro-pastoral communities. Here the expansion of crop farming has reduced the accessible land for pastoralist grazing and this heightens tensions.
Climate change exacerbates this situation. The dry season has been more pronounced in recent years. This has intensified the scarcity of resources, resulting in both groups competing for the same fertile lands and water sources.
It also means that herders need to search further afield for grazing land. This makes them more vulnerable to attacks by cattle rustlers, who position themselves along the transhumance corridors and water banks to attack and rob herders of their cattle.
A further vulnerability are young children. A professor of security studies from the University of Maroua, speaking to ENACT on condition of anonymity, explains that involving young children in cattle herding is embedded in the cultural and economic contexts of herding communities. This practice plays a vital role in defining Fulani identity, with early training being a fundamental aspect of preparing children to continue this herding way of life. He notes that consequently herders assigned to the grazing livestock are usually underage children who are incapable of recognising and assessing risks, and responding to threats that could compromise their and their cattle’s safety. These children are also unable to prevent or defend their herds and themselves against attacks by cattle rustlers.
Chad and Cameroon’s share a common border over 1 000 kilometres-long. A military officer in Waza who requested anonymity told ENACT that the issue of cattle rustling in the region is exacerbated by the large ungoverned spaces along the borders.
This vast space is poorly managed and inadequately policed by security forces, with limited capacity for surveillance of criminal cross-border activities. This favours criminal groups and non-state actors who trade and circulate small arms and ammunition. This free flow of arms provides for the needs of various bandit and terrorist cells operating as cattle rustlers, along with other criminal activities, in the region.
Cattle rustling in northern Cameroon and southern Chad involves a range of actors who participate at different levels, either as direct perpetrators or as enablers of the crime. They include terrorists, criminals or bandits without specific affiliations, fellow herdsmen, colluding community leaders and compromised security officers.
According to ACLED, the dominant actors involved in cattle rustling are Islamic State West Africa Province (71.4%), Boko Haram (9.5%), Ambazonian Separatists (8.1%) and unidentified armed groups (5.4%) (see Chart 2).
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Chart 2: Incidents of cattle rustling and associated criminal groups
 Source: Data generated from the ACLED repository by the authors |
Specialised criminal networks that engage in cattle rustling operate both locally and across borders. These groups are often highly organised. They use informants to identify herds, coordinate raids and employ middlemen to move the stolen cattle to markets, according to field research conducted by ENACT. They also have logistical support, such as access to trucks and cross-border smuggling routes.
Less organised bandit groups also engage in cattle rustling, often as part of other criminal activities, including armed robbery and kidnapping. These groups tend to operate in even more remote areas taking advantage of the lack of law enforcement and security.
Aiding the bandits and criminal networks, community collaborators serve as informants, corrupt security officials facilitate free passage to rustlers, and middlemen connect rustlers to buyers. Corruption and impunity are the fundamental enablers for these actors. The illicit proceeds of cattle rustling flow through the entire administrative chain, from the local authorities to the security officials, including elected officials in the communities.
The cattle rustling operations often follow specific patterns, including working with armed groups, cross-border raids, and targeting remote areas, such as livestock breeders in Bongor, Chad. The attackers frequently carry out night raids, armed assaults, and even kill or abduct herders. Many herders are forced to abandon their cattle due to the violence and intimidation.
Patrolling and monitoring these regions is difficult because of the dense forests, rugged mountains, rivers and marshlands that complicate both navigation and surveillance efforts. The road infrastructure is poor, and many areas cannot be reached by vehicle. This means that foot patrols or specialised equipment (that may not be readily available) is required.
As a result, rustlers can continue to act without consequence.
It is clear the cattle rustling in in southern Chad and northern Cameroon is a very complex issue. Addressing this will require a range of supportive, sustained cross-border actions.
Herders interviewed by ENACT agreed that governments could introduce community policing models tailored to rural areas affected by cattle rustling. This could empower local law enforcement officers to work closely with pastoralist communities to build trust and respond rapidly to incidents.
Communities can adopt cattle marking, branding or tagging programmes to help track ownership and movement of cattle. The state, security forces and development partners could provide technological support for digital systems that register livestock and reduce the resale of stolen cattle.
Investments in veterinary services, water points and grazing routes can reduce tensions over resources and improve the overall resilience of pastoralist communities, making them less vulnerable to rustling.
Oluwole Ojewale, ENACT Central Africa Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator, ISS Dakar
Image: MG Shotz/Pexels
